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Abstract
We analyze two-part tariﬀs in an oligopoly, where each ﬁrm commits to
a quantity and a ﬁxed fee prior to the determination of unit prices. In the
case of homogeneous consumers, Harrison and Kline (2001) showed that
the equilibrium involves marginal cost pricing and that increased compe-
tition aﬀects industry proﬁt and the tariﬀ structure solely by reducing the
ﬁxed fee. We show that ﬁrms’ pricing strategies may change when we allow
for demand side heterogeneity. In particular, we ﬁnd that the price per unit
can be either above or below marginal cost, and that the ﬁxed fee increases
with increased competition. Finally, some numerical examples show that
full market coverage may arise as an equilibrium feature in cases where a
monopolist would exclude low-demand types. Hence, fostering competi-
tion may contribute to the fulﬁllment of the Universal Service requirement
that is common in industries such as telecommunications, which applies
nonlinear pricing on a normal basis.
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1 Introduction
Nonlinear prices are common in many industries and have been studied exten-
sively in the economic literature. As shown in Oi (1971), a single two-part tariﬀ is
more eﬃcient when it comes to extracting consumer surplus in a monopoly than
is a uniform price.1 Harrison and Kline (2001) analyzed two-part tariﬀs in an
oligopoly with strategic interaction and homogeneous consumers. In their paper,
increased competition aﬀects industry proﬁt and tariﬀ structure solely by reduc-
ing the ﬁxed fee, and the tariﬀs are merely modiﬁcations of the tariﬀs described
by Oi (1971) in a monopoly. However, most industries consist of heterogeneous
consumers; for instance, in telecommunications there are distinct residential and
business markets. This may have important implications for the ﬁrms’ pricing
strategies and for regulatory policy concerned with market coverage and universal
service in the industry. The hypothesis that oligopolistic ﬁrms practice nonlinear
pricing is empirically supported by Miravete and Ro¨ller (2003, 2004). In this
paper, we build a more realistic model to study two-part tariﬀs than Harrison
and Kline (2001) by assuming that there are two types of consumers, instead of
only one. It turns out that such extension of their model has major impacts on
the qualitative results obtained.
Our starting point is the framework developed in Harrison and Kline (2001).
Each ﬁrm commits to a certain quantity, as in a traditional Cournot model. In
addition, each ﬁrm sets its ﬁxed fee, whereas the unit prices are determined by
market forces endogenously. Without the latter assumption, it is not possible to
escape a situation where a competing ﬁrm charges a uniform price and captures
all consumers. Harrison and Kline (2001) oﬀered some examples of industries
where this treatment makes sense, such as home computer games and consumer
clubs. Harrison and Kline (2001) extended the basic problem of charging a group
of N identical consumers according to a two-part tariﬀ, instead of a uniform unit
price, to a setting with competition – that is, they extended the ﬁrst part of the
model in Oi (1971) to oligopoly. In equilibrium, they found that the unit price is
set equal to marginal costs, and that the ﬁxed fee is positive for a given number
of ﬁrms, but that it approaches zero as the number of ﬁrms approaches inﬁnity.
Our extension of the Harrison and Kline (2001) model to two instead of one
type of consumersturns out to be important for the ﬁrms’ pricing policy. In
addition, it makes it possible to analyze how competition aﬀects market coverage
1The ﬁrm can achieve even greater proﬁt by screening consumers whose willingness to pay
diﬀers via a menu of two-part tariﬀs, or by using a more general nonlinear outlay schedule. The
ﬁrm takes into account the unobserved heterogeneity of individual demand by using a menu of
two-part tariﬀs, or a nonlinear outlay schedule, thereby introducing self-selection. See Wilson
(1993) on nonlinear pricing in a monopoly, Rochet and Stole (2003) for a guide to the screening
literature, and Stole (2001) for a comprehensive guide to the literature on price discrimination
in models with competition.
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– whether both types of consumers are served. A particular aim in this paper is
to explore whether full market coverage can arise as an equilibrium feature, and
we assume that a regulator can impose a Universal Service Obligation (USO) on
the ﬁrms. We explore whether a subgame with a Universal Service Obligation
is robust against unilateral deviations. In the absence of such an obligation, we
explore under what conditions ﬁrms are likely to cover the entire market.
First, let us assume full market coverage in the case of a USO, and pay at-
tention to the ﬁrms pricing policy. We then ﬁnd that the per unit price may
be below marginal costs when as few as four ﬁrms exist, and that the ﬁxed fee
may be positive even with an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms. Hence, we cannot ex-
tend the results in Oi (1971) to oligopoly with heterogeneous consumers. Also,
introducing consumer heterogeneity makes the demand side of the model more
complicated. In the homogeneous type case, consumers’ behavior vis a` vis each
ﬁrm is described by a single participation constraint. A consumer is indiﬀerent
between two tariﬀs with diﬀerent ﬁxed fees and per unit prices, as long as they
both satisfy his or her participation constraint. In the case of heterogeneous
consumers, consumers’ behavior vis a` vis each ﬁrm is given by two diﬀerent par-
ticipation constraints. Whenever low-demand consumers are indiﬀerent between
two tariﬀs, high-demand consumers will strictly prefer the one with a low per
unit price and a high ﬁxed fee. On the other hand, if high-demand consumers
are indiﬀerent between two tariﬀs, low-demand consumers will strictly prefer the
one with a low ﬁxed fee and a high per unit price. Hence, if one consumer
type is indiﬀerent between two ﬁrms, the other one will strictly prefer one of the
two ﬁrms. Consequently, unless they apply completely symmetric strategies, we
cannot expect all ﬁrms to serve both types of subscribers.
The extension of the model from one to two types of consumers partly ex-
plains the change in the per unit price. Without demand-side heterogeneity ﬁrms
practice cost-plus-ﬁxed fee pricing, and a marginal increase in market share af-
fects ﬁrm i’s proﬁt via the ﬁxed fee revenue. The per unit price is adjusted
to maximize consumer surplus, whereas the ﬁxed fee is adjusted to satisfy the
participation constraint. It is well known from a monopoly model that a ﬁrm
serving two types of consumers with a single two-part tariﬀ should let the unit
price exceed marginal costs. However, in our duopoly model with demand-side
heterogeneity, ﬁrms cannot change the ﬁxed fee on a unilateral basis without
violating the Universal Service requirement. Hence, they are de facto restricted
to compete in capacities. The isolated eﬀect of this is that the per unit price
will be above marginal cost. However, as each consumer pays a ﬁxed fee, a mar-
ginal increase in the market share increases the ﬁxed fee revenues, which induce
oligopolistic ﬁrms to compete more aggressively than they would do otherwise.
Our results show that if the ﬁxed fee is suﬃciently large, this eﬀect may dominate
and the ﬁrms price per unit below marginal cost.
Turning to the question of market coverage, we ﬁnd that fostering competi-
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tion can contribute to full market coverage and the fulﬁllment of the Universal
Service requirement. Our results show that a subgame with a USO is robust
against unilateral deviations. Moreover, in the absence of a USO, we ﬁnd that a
duopoly is more likely than a monopoly to cover the entire market. Hence, our
model does not support theories predicting that the ﬁrm operating under a Uni-
versal Service Obligation serves low-demand segments of the market while other
ﬁrms “skim the cream” by serving the more proﬁtable high-demand segments.
The monopolist’s decision to exclude low-demand segments is based on its abil-
ity to control consumers participation, and expected proﬁt per consumer (ﬁxed
fee revenue plus variable sales revenue) is the same at the cut-oﬀ level whether
the low demand segment is served or not. In a duopoly, if one ﬁrm deviates
by changing its market coverage, the per unit price at the other ﬁrm tends to
change at the same time. Hence, the participation constraints are changed, and
the deviating ﬁrm is not able to sustain the same expected proﬁt per consumer
as before a deviation.
The empirical research in Miravete and Ro¨ller (2003, 2004) on the US cellular
telephone industry support the hypothesis that nonlinear pricing prevails under
oligopolistic competition in telecommunications. Ivaldi and Martimort (1994)
showed that this is also the case for energy distribution.2 Universal Service ob-
jectives have been given much attention in Telecommunications, especially after
the introduction of competition.3 In our case, the weakness involved in focusing
on telecommunications is the assumption that ﬁrms commit to a ﬁxed fee and a
capacity, but do not commit to the per unit price at the ﬁrst stage. However, one
might argue that per unit prices are more ﬂexible than ﬁxed fees. For instance,
many mobile phone ﬁrms change their ﬁxed fees by replacing existing tariﬀs.4
On the other hand, changes in the per unit prices are made within existing tar-
iﬀs. Another practice that makes the per unit price more ﬂexible is that the
ﬁrms conduct continuous campaigns and promotional oﬀers, such as oﬀering con-
2The predictions are more ambiguous within the theoretical literature, which shows that
nonlinear pricing may not be sustainable in oligopoly. For example, Mandy (1992) found that
in a traditional Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous products – where we allow the ﬁrms to
set nonlinear prices – all prices may collapse to a uniform price. This ﬁnding illustrates that
some of the assumptions in the traditional oligopoly model have to be relaxed in order to make
nonlinear prices sustainable in oligopoly. One extension is to introduce capacity constraints, as
was done in Harrison and Kline (2001), Oren, Smith and Wilson (1983), Scotchmer (1985a,b),
and Wilson (1993). Another extension of the traditional Bertrand model is to introduce product
diﬀerentiation; see Calem and Spulber (1984), Castelli and Leporelli (1993), Economides and
Wildman (1995), Shmanske (1991), and Young (1991). If future demand is stochastic to some
extent, Hayes (1987) managed to sustain nonlinear pricing under competition by assuming that
consumers are risk averse and have a preference for two-part tariﬀs. In the case of telephony,
Miravete (2002) ruled out risk aversion as a possible source of consumers’ biased taste for ﬂat
rate tariﬀs.
3See for instance Riordan (2002) on Universal Service in Telecommunications.
4Some ﬁrms even list current and non-current tariﬀs on their web sites; see, for example,
www.vodafone.co.uk, and netcom.no.
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sumers free talk time, texts, or photo messages. In addition, telecommunications
ﬁrms tend to lock-in consumers by oﬀering subsidized handsets subject to a 12-
or 18-month contracts. Within this period, the ﬁxed fee is more or less the same,
but the per unit price is more ﬂexible.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate our model
using identical ﬁrms and characterize the outcome in two possible symmetric
strategy subgames, where either both types of consumers are served or only one.
In section 3, we explore the possibility that one, or both, of the symmetric strat-
egy subgames described in section 2.1 can be equilibria for the whole game in a
duopoly. We do so by asking ﬁrst, whether one ﬁrm would earn a higher proﬁt
if it deviates and covers the entire market in the subgame where the other ﬁrm
serves high-demand consumers only (section 3.1). Next, we check whether the
ﬁrm would earn a higher proﬁt if it deviates and serves high-demand consumers
only in the subgame where the other ﬁrm serves both types of consumers (section
3.2). By using a numerical example, we show that there can be multiple equilib-
ria. Moreover, we show that the situation where both ﬁrms serve both types of
consumers can be an equilibrium duopoly outcome in cases where the monopo-
list would prefer to serve high demand types only. The driving force is that the
rival, non-deviating ﬁrm supplies a given quantity that it is committed to selling,
which acts as a constraint on the deviating ﬁrm’s price setting. Our results are
summarized in Figure 8. Finally, section 4 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Cournot competition with two-part tariﬀs
Consider a setup with k identical ﬁrms, k ≥ 2, supplying a homogeneous product
to N consumers, ﬁrm i ∈ K = {1, 2, . . . , k} serving ni ≤ N consumers. We
consider the case where the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, leaving the question
of entry outside the model. The cornerstones of the model with homogeneous
demand are presented in Harrison and Kline (2001), so we provide only a brief
presentation of the set-up.5
Consumers. We assume that there are two groups of consumers: low-demand
and high-demand consumers. Demand-side heterogeneity is deﬁned by a type
parameter, θ, in the utility function. A proportion of consumers, λ, have the taste
parameter θ1, and a proportion, (1− λ), have the taste parameter θ2, where θ1 <
θ2. We will refer to the ﬁrst group as type 1 consumers, or low-demand consumers,
and to the other group as type 2 consumers, or high-demand consumers.
5It would be helpful for the reader to examine the seminal paper by Harrison and Kline that
explores the model setup and provides a thorough treatment of the model and the assumptions
that are needed in order to ensure that equilibrium exists. See also their article on entry in
this model.
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Consumers’ preferences are deﬁned by a quasi-linear utility function, as fol-
lows:
V =
{
u (q, θ)− T if they pay T and consume q units,
0 if they do not buy,
θ = {θ1, θ2},
u (q, θ2) ≥ u (q, θ1) and uq (q, θ2) ≥ uq (q, θ1) ∀q
(1)
The utility function is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in q,
u (0, ·) = 0, limq→0 uq (q, ·) ≥ c, limq→∞ uq (q, ·) ≤ 0. For any tariﬀ T = A + pq,
where A is a ﬁxed fee that is paid up-front and p is a per unit price, utility
maximization yields a downward-sloping demand curve for each individual that
is independent of income and, therefore, of the ﬁxed fee.
Then, the consumers’ indirect utility, gross of the ﬁxed fee, and the two
consumer types’ demand curves are given by:
q (p) ≡ q (p, θ) = maxq u (q, θ)− pq − A,
V (p, θ) = u (q (p) , θ)− pq (p) ,
V ′p = −q (p) ,
 = 1, 2.
(2)
Firms. The cost function is characterized by constant returns to scale, C (Q) =
cQ, where c > 0 is the marginal cost and Q is output. For simplicity, ﬁxed costs
are omitted from all measures. If ﬁrm i serves ni consumers, its proﬁt is given
by:
Πi = niAi + (pi − c)Qi. (3)
As the ﬁxed fee is a lump sum transfer from consumers to the ﬁrm, the unit
price in ﬁrm i’s tariﬀ is adjusted in such a way that aggregate demand for ﬁrm
i’s product is equal to ﬁrm i’s supply. Hence, the unit price is independent of the
ﬁxed fee. Whenever the ﬁxed fee is positive, consumers will make all or nothing
purchases at ﬁrm i. When ﬁrm i serves a total of ni consumers, the unit price is
adjusted to satisfy the following market clearing condition:
Qi = niq2 (pi) . (4)
The unit prices charged by rival ﬁrms are adjusted to satisfy the market
clearing condition and consumers’ participation constraints. Let the aggregate
supply by ﬁrms competing with ﬁrm i be given by:
QJ ≡
∑
j =i
Qj. (5)
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In particular, if every other ﬁrm charges the same per unit price p−i, this
must satisfy the condition:
QJ = (N(1− λ)− ni) q2(p−i). (6)
The ﬁrm cannot exclude any consumer from buying its product. Taking
consumer behavior into account, ﬁrms act to maximize proﬁt by choosing an
appropriate strategy si = (Qi, Ai), with Qi > 0 for all i ∈ K. We assume that
ﬁrms are able to commit to this strategy.
Consumer equilibrium. The allocation of consumers across ﬁrms (ni, i ∈ K)
is described by utility maximization. With quasilinear utility, we can measure
the indirect utility in monetary terms. Consumers choose to buy if they obtain a
nonnegative net surplus at some ﬁrm i, that is, if V (pi, θ)−Ai ≥ 0, (i ∈ K,  =
{1, 2}). They buy from the ﬁrm that provides them with the highest surplus
– that is, they buy from ﬁrm i if V (pi, θ) − Ai > V (pj, θ) − Aj, (i, j ∈ K,
i = j,  = {1, 2}). For a given strategy combination s = (Qi, Ai)i∈K , there exists
a consumer equilibrium satisfying both utility maximization and market clearing,
deﬁning a consumer-price proﬁle as (n, p) = ((n1, . . . , nk), (p1, . . . , pk)), with ni
being the number of consumers buying from ﬁrm i, and pi being the unit price
that clears the market at ﬁrm i. Although we deﬁne a ﬁrm’s strategy in terms
of its capacity and the ﬁxed fee, from a consumer’s point of view he choose the
quantity that maximizes his or her utility for a given Ai and pi, and obtain net
utility V (pi, θ)− Ai. This is formally deﬁned in Harrison and Kline (2001).
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Figure 1: Consumer behavior with identical consumers.
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Consider a situation with two ﬁrms, 1 and 2, serving consumers of type
 only. As illustrated in ﬁgure 1, the consumer is indiﬀerent between (A1, p1)
and (A2, p2) because they are located on the same indiﬀerence curve, PC. The
slope of the indiﬀerence curve is the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between the per unit price and the ﬁxed fee, which is given by dp/dA =
−1/q(p); that is, the larger is the consumer’s willingness to pay for quantity, the
smaller is his or her MRS. Given that the market clears at both ﬁrms at prices
p1 and p2, strategies (Q1, A1) and (Q2, A2) map into a consumer equilibrium
((n1, n2), (p1, p2)), with ni determined by Qi = niq(pi). If Firm 1 increases its
output, the price at Firm 1 will fall, which will induce consumers to switch from
Firm 2 to Firm 1, and consumer equilibrium is restored at (A1, p
′
1) and (A2, p
′
2). If
Firm 1 increases output and the ﬁxed fee simultaneously, consumer equilibrium is
restored at (A′1, p
′
1) and (A2, p2). As is well known from Oi (1971), if a monopoly
can appropriate the entire consumer surplus above some exogenous level U¯ , it
will apply marginal cost pricing, (A∗1, c). Harrison and Kline (2001) showed that
oligopoly ﬁrms will attract customers by lowering the access fee. In addition,
they observed that per unit price equals marginal cost, as in a monopoly. Thus,
established insights from monopoly two-part pricing could lead us to believe that
the oligopoly results extend to demand-side heterogeneity, and that price will be
set above marginal cost to adjust for the heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness
to pay. However, as we show in the following section, introducing demand-side
heterogeneity makes the demand side of the model more complicated because
consumer behavior vis a` vis each ﬁrm is given by two diﬀerent participation
constraints, one for low-demand consumers and one for high-demand consumers.
Firms choose their strategies simultaneously and independently, giving a
strategy combination s = (s1, s2, . . . , sk). If ﬁrms choose symmetric strategies,
si = s = (Q,A), there are two possible outcomes: (i) both types of consumers are
served, or (ii) only high-demand consumers buy. Conﬁning ourselves to symmet-
ric strategy combinations, we explore whether it is likely that the entire market
is covered in an oligopoly, and analyze the pricing strategy that may arise in
equilibrium. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 characterize two possible subgames where the
ﬁrms adopt symmetric strategies with respect to the capacity and ﬁxed fee. Sec-
tion 3 explores the ﬁrms’ incentives to deviate from the two symmetric-strategy
subgames in a duopoly.
2.1 Consumer equilibrium with heterogeneity
For a strategy combination to map into a consumer equilibrium where all ﬁrms
serve both consumer types, all ﬁrms must charge identical ﬁxed fees. In a con-
sumer equilibrium, it is not possible for any consumer to obtain a larger surplus
by switching to another supplier. If it is possible to obtain a positive surplus
from at least one ﬁrm, there will be no excess demand. Further, demand will be
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equal to supply at each ﬁrm.
Consider a strategy combination where ﬁrms i and j announce diﬀerent ﬁxed
fees (as in ﬁgure 1) above). Low-demand consumers are indiﬀerent between ﬁrms
i and j when:
V (pi, θ1)− Ai = V (pj, θ1)− Aj. (7)
Hence, if Ai > Aj, it must be the case that pi < pj. If this is the case between all
pairs i, j, i = j, each ﬁrm will serve (N/k)λ low demand types. If a high-demand
consumer buys from ﬁrm i, he or she obtains:
V (pi, θ2)− V (pi, θ1) + V (pj, θ1)− Aj, (8)
whereas if he or she buys from ﬁrm j, the high-demand consumer obtains:
V (pj, θ2)− Aj. (9)
High-demand types are indiﬀerent between the ﬁrms if:
0V (pi, θ2)− V (pi, θ1) + V (pj, θ1)− Aj = V (pj, θ2)− Aj. (10)
Hence, when per unit prices are adjusted to satisfy (7), the high-demand
consumers’ participation constraint cannot bind simultaneously because (10) re-
quires that pi = pj, as q2(p) > q1(p).
This situation is illustrated in Figure 2. Low-demand consumers obtain a
zero surplus along PC1, whereas high-demand consumers obtain a zero surplus
along PC2, and a strictly positive surplus along PC
′
2 and PC
′′
2. At any point, low-
demand consumers’ indiﬀerence curves are steeper than are high-demand con-
sumers’ indiﬀerence curves because q2(p) > q1(p). In other words, high-demand
consumers are willing to accept a larger increase in the ﬁxed fee against a de-
crease in the per unit price, relative to low-demand consumers. Moreover, the
high-demand consumer’s utility at B is larger than at A, whereas low-demand
types are indiﬀerent between A and B. Type 1 consumers are indiﬀerent no mat-
ter what the sizes of p and A are at each ﬁrm, as long as they are adjusted
according to (7). However, type 2 consumers will always prefer the tariﬀ with
the lowest per unit price. If low-demand types are indiﬀerent between the two
tariﬀs, high-demand types strictly prefer the tariﬀ with the low per unit price.
Consequently, a situation with diﬀerent ﬁxed fees is not a sustainable consumer
equilibrium if we want this to involve all ﬁrms serving both types of consumers.
If the consumer equilibrium is the result of a symmetric strategy combination
si = (Q,A), (i = 1, . . . , k), we assume that all ﬁrms serve an equal share of each
consumer type, and the consumer equilibrium is given by the proﬁle (n, p). Hence,
if both types are served by all ﬁrms, ﬁrm i serves a number of consumers given
by N/k. If low-demand types are excluded, the number is (1− λ)N/k.
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Figure 2: High- and low-demand consumers’ indiﬀerence curves over a ﬁxed fee
and per unit price. Low-demand types are indiﬀerent between A and B, whereas
high-demand consumers strictly prefer B.
A strategy combination with identical ﬁxed fees, but diﬀerent capacities
across ﬁrms, will result in a consumer equilibrium where the ﬁrms serve dif-
ferent numbers of consumers. Suppose, for instance, that there are two ﬁrms
in the market, Firm 1 and Firm 2. Suppose that Firm 1 increases its output.
This causes a fall in the per unit price at Firm 1 because there would be excess
supply otherwise. Consumers are attracted by the lower price at Firm 1 and
are tempted to leave Firm 2. Hence, the per unit price will fall at Firm 2 as
well. As the ﬁxed fee is identical across ﬁrms, unit prices must also be the same.
Firm 1 will serve more customers than under a symmetric strategy combination,
with both A and Q identical across ﬁrms. However, we will assume that the
ﬁrms all serve the same share of high-demand and low-demand consumers be-
cause each consumer is indiﬀerent between all ﬁrms. This is suﬃcient to ensure
that there exists a consumer equilibrium deﬁning a consumer-price proﬁle (n, p)
for a strategy combination with symmetric ﬁxed fees, when there is demand-side
heterogeneity.
2.2 Symmetric strategy subgames with linear demand
Given the discontinuities of demand faced by the ﬁrms, generally it is not possible
to solve for the equilibria of the game analytically. Instead, we derive some
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insights into two-part pricing in oligopoly by focusing on two possible symmetric
strategy combination subgames. In the ﬁrst subgame, low-demand types are
excluded from making purchases, whereas in the second subgame, both types are
served. Next, in section 3, we search for the equilibria for the duopoly version of
the game, using a numerical example with linear demand and constant marginal
cost.
Hereafter, we focus on a speciﬁc case where consumers’ preferences are rep-
resented by a quadratic utility function. We let the reservation utility be zero for
both consumers. V = θq− 12q2−T ,  = 1, 2, if the consumers pay T and consume
q units. Otherwise, the consumers obtain zero utility. Each consumer has a linear
demand function q = θ−p,  = 1, 2. Letting θ ≡ λθ1+(1− λ) θ2 ≥ θ1, expected
demand is λq1+(1− λ) q2 = θ−p ≡ q(p, θ). For a consumer paying a unit price of
p, the indirect utility, exclusive of the ﬁxed fee, is V (p, θ) =
1
2
(θ − p)2,  = 1, 2.
Demand elasticity is deﬁned as ε(p, θ) = −q′p(p, θ)p/q(p, θ) = p/(θ − p).
Because we are interested in how equilibrium strategies are aﬀected by het-
erogeneity in demand, the example is simpliﬁed by letting θ1 = 1 and c =
1
2
.
Increased demand-side heterogeneity is captured by variations in λ and θ2. Then,
high heterogeneity can arise either from an increase in the number of type 2 con-
sumers (λ decreases), or because a type 2 consumer has a higher willingness to
pay relative to a type 1 consumer (θ2 increases). Hence, increased demand-side
heterogeneity is captured by an increase in θ.
In this section, we are particularly interested in whether a symmetric strategy
subgame where all ﬁrms serve both consumer types can be a stable equilibrium,
or if it is more likely that a symmetric strategy subgame where all ﬁrms serve
high-demand consumers only is an equilibrium for the whole game. We do not
consider asymmetric strategy subgames as equilibrium candidates. Hence, we
proceed by characterizing the ﬁrms’ symmetric strategies and the corresponding
consumer equilibrium in these two speciﬁc subgames. Then, we analyze the
ﬁrms’ incentives to deviate from a symmetric strategy. As will be demonstrated
in section 3, there is no unique equilibrium with respect to market coverage in
this game, and we may have multiple equilibria.
Low-demand types excluded. Consider ﬁrst the subgame when the ﬁrms
serve high-demand consumers only (S1), which is the case presented in Harrison
and Kline (2001). Firms choose a capacity and a ﬁxed fee at stage one, and per
unit prices are determined at stage two. When rival ﬁrms charge their consumers
according to the tariﬀ T−i = A−i+p−iq, a consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
from ﬁrm i and one of the other ﬁrms when his or her participation constraint
is binding. If the ﬁrm leaves the consumer with additional surplus, it sacriﬁces
proﬁt. If there is at least one additional active ﬁrm where consumers would buy a
strictly positive quantity, we expect that the participation constraint is binding.
Firm i maximizes proﬁt subject to voluntary participation and market clear-
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ing, as follows:
Πi = niAi + (pi − c)Qi. (11)
Ai = V (pi, θ2)− V (p−i, θ2) + A−i
QJ = (N(1− λ)− ni)q2(p−i)
Qi = niq2(pi).
(12)
The outcome is stated in Lemma 1. The calculations leading to Lemma 1 are
given in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 (S1: Low-demand types are excluded) In a symmetric strategy
subgame, s = si = (Q
2
TT , A
2
TT )i∈K, where low-demand consumers are excluded,
the ﬁrms’ best response with respect to capacity and the ﬁxed fee results in a con-
sumer equilibrium where the per unit price is equal to marginal cost.
As the number of ﬁrms (k) approaches inﬁnity, the ﬁxed fee and the proﬁt ap-
proach zero
p2TT = c,
A2TT = min
{
V (c, θ2),
cq2(c)
(k − 1) ε(c)
}
,
Q2TT ≡ Q =
N
k
(1− λ)q2(c).
Lemma 1 is the result in Harrison and Kline (2001). These authors provided
a thorough treatment of Cournot competition with two-part tariﬀs and a single
consumer type and guided the reader through all proofs. In addition, they showed
that the pricing described in Lemma 1 is a unique Nash equilibrium in pricing
strategies in the single consumer-type game. In addition to the equilibrium with
symmetric market shares, there also exist equilibria that are asymmetric in mar-
ket shares.
According to this Lemma, the ﬁxed fee in the single consumer-type case
converges toward zero as the number of ﬁrms approaches inﬁnity. The optimal
tariﬀ is a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ. If ﬁrm i takes the number of consumers it
serves as given, for any tariﬀ charged by rival ﬁrms, the reservation utility is
deﬁned as a constant and will not aﬀect the optimization with respect to unit
price. Then, the problem resembles the monopoly problem, and the marginal
price is identical to that in a monopoly. To attract additional consumers from
rival ﬁrms, ﬁrm i has to adjust the ﬁxed fee. Hence, a marginal increase in
market share aﬀects ﬁrm i’s proﬁt via the ﬁxed fee. Finding the proﬁt maximizing
strategy reduces to ﬁnding the optimal number of consumers to serve.
Both consumer types are served. Now, we turn to the symmetric strategy
subgame where all ﬁrms are obliged to cover the market (S2). As prices are deter-
mined by market clearing conditions at the last stage, it is possible to determine
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the best response capacity for some arbitrary ﬁxed fee, A ≥ 0. As described
above, one ﬁrm can increase its market share by increasing its capacity and ac-
cepting a lower per unit price. For any ﬁxed fee A, in the interval [0, V (0, 1)],
there exists a unique best response capacity Q = N
k
q(p, θ). However, for each
ﬁxed fee there exists only one per unit price such that the participation con-
straint for low-demand consumers binds simultaneously. Then, of all the possible
pairs (A, p) satisfying the ﬁrms’ best response behavior, we focus on the pair that
satisﬁes V (p, 1) = A. Lemma 2 presents the symmetric strategy subgame where
these conditions are taken into account.
Lemma 2 (S2: Both consumer types are served) In a symmetric strategy
subgame s = si = (Q
12
TT , A
12
TT )i∈K, where low-demand consumers are served, the
ﬁrms’ best response with respect to capacity choice results in a consumer equilib-
rium with a per unit price between zero and the uniform Cournot price.
If the number of ﬁrms (k) is not too large, and/or if demand-side heterogeneity
(θ) is suﬃciently large, the per unit price is above marginal cost. Otherwise, the
market clearing price falls below marginal cost. Let θ ∈ 〈1, 2]
(a) The per unit price and the ﬁxed fee are determined jointly by conditions:
p12TT−c
p12TT
= 1
kε(p12TT ,θ)
(
1− (k − 1)ε(p12TT , θ) A
12
TT
q(p12TT ,θ)p
12
TT
)
,
A12TT = V (p
12
TT , 1) > 0.
(c) The ﬁrms’ capacity is given by:
Q12TT =
N
k
(
λq1(p
12
TT ) + (1− λ)q2(p12TT )
)
> 0.
(d) For k ≤ 3+8θ(θ− 1), the per unit price is above marginal cost. Otherwise,
the per unit price is below marginal cost. The ﬁxed fee (the per unit price)
increases (decreases) with k. For any ﬁnite number k, ﬁxed fee revenues
more than cover losses in variable proﬁt. In the limit case where k → ∞,
the ﬁxed fee revenues (N/k)A12TT exactly covers the aggregate per unit loss
(p12TT − c)Q12TT , and proﬁt becomes zero. Finally, proﬁt is always larger in
this subgame with two-part tariﬀs than it is in a uniform pricing game.
Lemma 2 is proved in Appendix B. Lemma 2 shows that there are nontrivial
diﬀerences between pricing in the homogeneous type case and the heterogeneous
type case when the ﬁrm is exposed to competition. First, depending on the degree
of competition and on the demand-side heterogeneity, the per unit price varies
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between zero and the uniform Cournot price.6 Hence, ﬁrms may charge per unit
below marginal cost. Second, the size of the ﬁxed fee increases with the number
of ﬁrms, and ﬁrms are able to extract all surplus from low-demand consumers. In
contrast to this, the per unit price with homogeneous demand is always equal to
marginal cost and independent of the number of ﬁrms, and the ﬁxed fee decreases
with the number of ﬁrms.
The extension of the model from one to two types of consumers partly ex-
plains the change in the per unit price. Without demand-side heterogeneity ﬁrms
practice cost-plus-ﬁxed fee pricing, and a marginal increase in market share af-
fects ﬁrm i’s proﬁt via the ﬁxed fee revenue. The per unit price is adjusted
to maximize consumer surplus, whereas the ﬁxed fee is adjusted to satisfy the
participation constraint. It is well known from a monopoly model that a ﬁrm
serving two types of consumers with a single two-part tariﬀ should let the unit
price exceed marginal costs; see Oi (1971). 7 However, in our duopoly model
with demand-side heterogeneity, ﬁrms cannot change the ﬁxed fee on a unilateral
basis without violating the Universal Service requirement. Hence, they are de
facto restricted to compete in capacities. The isolated eﬀect of this is that the
per unit price will be above marginal cost. However, as each consumer pays a
ﬁxed fee, a marginal increase in the market share increases the ﬁxed fee revenues,
which induce oligopolistic ﬁrms to compete more aggressively than they would
do otherwise. The ﬁxed fee is sheltered from competition, and the ﬁrms compete
aggressively in order to capture the ﬁxed fee revenues by lowering the per unit
price. If the number of competitors is big, and demand-side heterogeneity is not
too large, this eﬀect may dominate and the ﬁrms prefer a high ﬁxed fee and a per
unit price below marginal cost. Hence, if the ﬁrms can coordinate (or collude)
on the ﬁxed fee, they prefer a high ﬁxed fee and a per unit price below marginal
cost. The regulated per subscriber line price of unbundled access to the local
loop can be an instrument for such coordination (or collusion).
Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of Lemma 2 in the duopoly case.
We ﬁnd the duopoly symmetric strategy subgame tariﬀ by searching for a ﬁxed
fee along the path pˆ(θ, A), such that the low-demand consumers’ participation
constraint is binding (at D(θ)). The monopoly tariﬀ is found by choosing a
ﬁxed fee such that the participation constraint binds at a per unit price p12M (at
M(θ)). As θ approaches one – that is, as demand-side heterogeneity vanishes –
the duopoly tariﬀ approaches (A¯12TT , p¯
12
TT ), whereas the monopoly tariﬀ approaches
(A¯12M , c). However, as the demand-side heterogeneity (θ) increases, p
12
M increases
6The per unit price in a uniform pricing k-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly is given by: (p12UC −
c)/p12UC =
1
kε(p12UC ,θ)
.
7The mark-up in a two-part pricing monopoly with heterogeneous demand is given by:
(p12M − c)/p12M = 1−λε(p12M ,θ)
( q2(p12M )−q1(p12M )
q(p12M ,θ)
)
= 1
ε(p12M ,θ)
(
1 − q1(p12M )
q(p12M ,θ)
)
, i.e., p12M ≥ c. The price-cost
margin is higher the larger is the diﬀerence between the consumer types (θ1 versus θ2), and the
larger is the proportion of high-demand consumers (λ approaches zero).
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12
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in θ, and p12TT decreases in k. The duopoly per unit price can exceed the monopoly
per unit price, and p12TT can fall below marginal cost for k ≥ 3
faster than p12TT , and for θ >
1
2
(
√
2 + 1) we ﬁnd that p12M > p
12
TT , (M(θ) lies
north-west of D(θ)). If θ > 5
4
, we ﬁnd that p12M > p
12
UC , (M(θ) lies north-west
of p12UC). When θ is close to 1.5, p
12
M is close to one and low-demand consumers’
purchases are close to zero, p12TT is close to one when θ is close to two. The
trade-oﬀ between competition and demand-side heterogeneity in per unit prices
is illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 5 illustrates pricing and proﬁt in the k-ﬁrm
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symmetric strategy subgame described in Lemma 2. The ﬁxed fee increases as
competition becomes ﬁercer, whereas the per unit price decreases and falls below
marginal cost if a sixth ﬁrm enters the market.
3 Symmetric strategy duopoly equilibrium
In this section, we ascertain whether one of the symmetric strategy combinations
in section 2.2 can be an equilibrium for the whole game when ﬁrms make their
decision about market coverage in a duopoly. In particular, we want to explore
whether full market coverage can arise as an equilibrium feature. As is well known
from studies on monopoly, it is sometimes beneﬁcial for a ﬁrm to exclude low-
demand segments in order to exploit the larger willingness to pay of high-demand
segments. In other cases, it will be preferable to serve both high-demand and
low-demand segments. It is important for a regulatory agency concerned about
universal service in the industry to establish whether full market coverage arises in
equilibrium. If the subgame S1 is robust against unilateral deviations, full market
coverage is less likely to occur. It is likely that the regulator emphasizes market
coverage and it may impose a Universal Service Obligation on one of the ﬁrms. If
the subgame S2 is robust against unilateral deviations, fostering competition can
be a way to achieve full market coverage and the Universal Service requirement. If
the subgame S2 is not robust against deviations, we expect that the ﬁrms will try
to avoid the obligation, for instance, by oﬀering optional tariﬀs that are attractive
to high-demand consumers only. Firms operating without such obligations will
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aim at high-demand segments, in other words, “cream scimming”.
The monopolist’s cut-oﬀ value is found simply by comparing the monopoly
proﬁt in the two alternatives. Hence, if Π2M > Π
12
M low-demand segments will be
excluded. If λ < λ∗, the monopolist serves only type 2 consumers, whereas if
λ > λ∗, it serves both segments.
λ ≡ λ∗(θ) = 1
2
+
3−4θ2+
 
(4θ22−3)(4θ22−8θ2+5)
8(θ2−1)2 . (13)
For any pair (θ2, λ) satisfying λ
∗(θ2), the per unit price is higher than the
monopoly per unit price.8. According to Lemma 2, the duopoly extracts all
surplus from low-demand consumers in subgame S2. Thus, although a duopoly
extracts all surplus from low-demand consumers, the joint duopoly proﬁt is lower
than the monopoly proﬁt. Further, if the two ﬁrms were able to coordinate their
decisions with respect to market coverage, they would choose to exclude low-
demand consumers in some cases where these consumers would have been served
in a monopoly. However, as we will demonstrate, without coordination it is
diﬃcult to sustain a duopoly outcome that excludes low-demand consumers from
the market. A monopoly ﬁrm can extract surplus from high-demand segments by
deliberately excluding low-demand segments, because a monopoly can choose to
design a tariﬀ that low-demand segments would never accept. However, a duopoly
ﬁrm cannot prevent a competing ﬁrm from applying a tariﬀ that low-demand
segments will accept, and such a tariﬀ will be strictly preferred by high-demand
segments.
In the following two sections, we examine the incentive of one ﬁrm to deviate
from the symmetric strategy combination subgames in Lemma 1 and 2. Section
3.1 examines one ﬁrm’s incentive to deviate when the low-demand segment is
excluded (from S1). Section 3.2 examines the incentive to deviate when both
consumer types are served (from S2).
3.1 Deviation if low-demand consumers are excluded
First, let us consider a symmetric strategy combination where both ﬁrms serve
only high-demand consumers, and the tariﬀ is given by (A2TT , c), A
2
TT = V (c, θ2),
and na = nb =
N
2
(1− λ).
One ﬁrm, say Firm a, could deviate by setting a tariﬀ (or, properly speak-
ing, choosing a strategy) that low-demand consumers are willing to accept, thus
capturing all type 1 consumers, λN . However, as low-demand consumers derive
a nonnegative surplus, high-demand consumers will derive a strictly positive sur-
plus by switching to Firm a. Then, the deviating ﬁrm will serve a mix of both
8They are identical for λ = 12 +
θ2−
√
2
2(θ2−1)
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types. It will serve all type 1 consumers and more than half, but not all, of
type 2 consumers because the other ﬁrm holds capacity nbq2(c), which it will sell.
Because Firm a increases its market size, this tends to make such a deviation
proﬁtable. However, proﬁt per consumer is reduced.
Let the deviating ﬁrm choose a strategy (Q˜12TT , A˜
12
TT ), or equivalently, charge
a tariﬀ (A˜12TT , p˜
12
TT ) in order to maximize proﬁt, subject to voluntary participation
and Firm b’s strategy (Q2TT , A
2
TT ). The problem is to maximize the following:
Π˜12TT = [N − n¯b] A˜12TT+ (14)(
p˜12TT − c
)
[Nλq˜1 + (N (1− λ)− nb) q˜2] ,
subject to
V (p˜12TT , 1) ≥ A˜12TT (15)
V
(
p˜12TT , θ2
)− V (p˜12TT , 1) = V (p¯2TT , θ2)− V (c, θ2) (16)
N
2
(1− λ) q2 ≥ n¯bq¯2, (17)
where q˜i = qi (p˜
12
TT ) ,  = 1, 2, q¯2 = q2 (p¯
2
TT ), and q2 = q2 (c). In order to re-
store voluntary participation, the unit price at ﬁrm b falls to p¯2TT < c. As a
unit price reduction leads in turn to an increase in type 2 consumers’ demand,
q2(p¯
2
TT ) > q2(c), the capacity supplied by Firm b becomes insuﬃcient to serve
half the population of type 2 consumers, and n¯b < (1− λ)N/2 is adjusted to re-
store market clearing at Firm b. Formally, the participation constraint (16) and
the market clearing condition (17) jointly determine Firm b’s share of type 2 con-
sumers as a function of Firm a’s strategy, n¯b = n¯b(p¯2(p˜
12
TT )). One such deviation is
illustrated in Figure 6. S1 is given by the tariﬀ at A on PC2, where high-demand
types are indiﬀerent between buying and not buying – that is, the high-demand
types’ participation constraint is binding. PC2 is the indiﬀerence curve, where
the net utility of type 2 consumers is zero, V (p, θ2) − A = 0. The participa-
tion constraint of low-demand consumers is binding along the indiﬀerence curve
through C (equation 15), and high-demand types are indiﬀerent between B and
C because they are on the same indiﬀerence curves (equation 16). As the per
unit price is lower in B, Firm b serves less than N(1− λ)/2.
Although Firm a obtains a lower proﬁt per consumer when it deviates, it
expands its market. When λ is low, or θ2 is high, the market expansion eﬀect
is less likely to cover the loss of proﬁt per consumer. In that case, there are
few type 1 consumers to serve and expected proﬁt per consumer is signiﬁcantly
lower when Firm a deviates. Conversely, we expect that a deviation is proﬁtable
when demand-side heterogeneity is low. For a value of λ close to λ∗, the expected
revenue per consumer is identical. Therefore, we conjecture that it is proﬁtable
to deviate.
In our numerical example, we ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate if λ > λ∗D(θ2),
where λ∗ < λ∗D. The results conﬁrm our conjecture.
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2
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3.2 Deviation if low-demand types are served
Second, let us consider the equilibrium candidate when both ﬁrms serve both
types of consumers, and the ﬁrms’ tariﬀs are given by (A12TT , p
12
TT ). Type 2 con-
sumers enjoy a positive surplus and type 1 consumers receive a zero surplus.
Firms have equal market shares, serving N/2 each, and they serve low-demand
types and high-demand consumers in proportions λ and (1−λ), respectively. The
consumer equilibrium per unit price will always be larger than the marginal cost
because k = 2 < 3+8θ(θ−1) for θ > 1. Pricing in the subgame where both ﬁrms
serve both consumer types is described in Appendix C. Let us now consider a
unilateral deviation by Firm a, (A˜2TT , p˜
2
TT ), when the strategy for Firm b is ﬁxed,
(Q12TT , A
12
TT ).
In this case, Firm a can deviate by using one of two strategies: (i) Firm a
aims to serve all type 2 consumers, na = N(1− λ), but to leave them a positive
surplus. In that case, the ﬁrm sets A˜2TT < V (c, θ2); (ii) knowing that Firm b has
a limited capacity, Firm a could act as a monopoly on any residual demand. The
ﬁrm will then serve less than the entire pool of type 2 consumers, na < N(1−λ),
but it will extract all of the surplus A˜2TT = V (c, θ2).
Consider the ﬁrst strategy. Firm a announces a tariﬀ (A˜2TT , c) that is strictly
preferred by type 2 consumers. The ﬁrm will extract as much as possible from
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type 2 consumers via the ﬁxed fee and will maximize the following:
Π˜2TT = N (1− λ) A˜2TT , (18)
subject to:
V (c, θ2)− A˜2TT ≥ V
(
p¯12TT , θ2
)− A12TT (19)
N
2
(λq1 + (1− λ) , q2) ≥ Nλq¯1 (20)
where qi = qi (p
12
TT ), ( = 1, 2), and q¯1 = q1 (p¯
12
TT ). The unit price p¯
12
TT is adjusted
to account for the fact that Firm b is now left with type 1 consumers only, instead
of a mix of type 1 and type 2 consumers. Given that type 1 consumers receive
exactly their reservation utility, the unit price that clears the market at Firm b
cannot exceed p12TT . Instead, type 1 consumers are rationed at Firm b. Hence,
0 < p¯12TT < p
12
TT . This restricts the ﬁxed fee in (19), which in turn will restrict the
proﬁts earned on type 2 consumers.
Looking at (18), it may appear that a deviation is proﬁtable when λ is small.
However, when λ is small, p¯12TT is low to ensure market clearing at Firm b, which
restricts the size of the ﬁxed fee that Firm a can charge type 2 consumers. If
p¯12TT < c, we have A˜
2
TT < A
12
TT . In our numerical example, we are not able
to ﬁnd any proﬁtable deviations, except for (θ2, λ) close to (1,
1
2
), which is not
economically interesting because it implies that the willingness to pay of the two
groups is almost identical, and that the groups are of the same size. In that case,
rather than charging a per unit price above marginal cost and extracting the
entire consumer surplus, Firm a would rather serve one half of the market at a
per unit price equal to marginal cost and extract almost all of the surplus. This
suggests that a duopoly outcome where both ﬁrms serve both types of consumers
can be an equilibrium outcome in situations where a monopolist would have
preferred to serve only one type of consumer.
Figure 7(a)-7(c) illustrates possible deviations along the high demand con-
sumers indiﬀerence curve through A, where high demand consumers are equal
oﬀ as before. The bold, dashed line is low demand consumers’ participation
constraint (where V (p, 1) = A). The other dashed lines represents indiﬀerence
curves with positive net utility for type 1. The bold, solid line is high demand
consumers’ participation constraint (where V (p, θ2) = A). The other solid lines
represents indiﬀerence curves with positive net utility for type 2. Firm a aims to
serve type 2 consumers at a tariﬀ given by point B. If the per unit price at Firm
b falls, for instance to point D, the ﬁxed fee at the deviating ﬁrm must be lower
than at point B. In ﬁgures 7(a) and 7(b), B is not a feasible tariﬀ because type
2 consumers strictly prefer D over B. Type 2 consumers are indiﬀerent between
C and D. At best, therefore, the deviating ﬁrm can oﬀer tariﬀ C. In ﬁgure 7(c),
low-demand consumers are rationed at Firm b, where they pay the per unit price
before deviation. In addition, Firm a can actually apply the tariﬀ at B, but it is
left with few high-demand consumers.
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The other possible deviation strategy is for Firm a to act as a monopoly on
any residual demand from type 2 consumers, as illustrated by tariﬀ B on PC2 in
ﬁgure 7(d). This time, consider a deviation where Firm a announces a tariﬀ that
extracts all surplus from type 2 consumers, B= (V (c, θ2) , c). Type 2 consumers
enjoy a positive surplus by switching to Firm b’s tariﬀ. Hence, because capacity
at Firm b is insuﬃcient to meet all demand, type 2 consumers will crowd out type
1 consumers at Firm b. Firm a earns monopoly proﬁts on each type 2 consumer
it serves, and aggregate proﬁt is given by:
Π˜2TT = [N (1− λ)− n¯b]V (c, θ2) , (21)
where n¯b is the number of type 2 consumers that can be served by Firm b. Type
2 consumers are indiﬀerent between the two ﬁrms’ tariﬀs when they receive a
zero surplus. Hence, the unit price in Firm b’s tariﬀ must be adjusted in order to
restore voluntary participation for type 2 consumers, p¯2TT . This time, Firm b is
left with type 2 consumers only, instead of a mix of type 1 and type 2 consumers,
as follows:
V
(
p¯2TT , θ2
)− A12TT ≥ 0 (22)
N
2
(λq1 + (1− λ) q2) ≥ n¯bq¯2 (23)
N (1− λ) ≥ n¯b. (24)
We ﬁnd no examples where such a deviation is proﬁtable, except for (θ2, λ)
close to (1, 0), which is not very interesting because it means that there are very
few type 1 consumers and that their willingness to pay is very close to that of type
2 consumers. Again, the fact that the non-deviating ﬁrm has committed itself to
selling a certain quantity acts as a constraint on the deviating ﬁrm’s behavior.
If there are few type 2 consumers, the non-deviating ﬁrm would serve them all
and the deviating ﬁrm would have no residual demand. If there are many type
2 consumers, the price per unit would be closer to marginal costs. If so, there
is a more limited scope for the deviating ﬁrm to generate additional consumer
surplus from type 2 consumers by setting price per unit equal to marginal costs.
Figure 8 summarizes our conclusions. The north-west part of the diagram
characterizes a case with low heterogeneity, whereas the south-east part char-
acterizes a case with high heterogeneity. Using monopoly two-part pricing as a
reference, we know that low-demand consumers will be excluded if the parameter
values lie in regions B, B1, C, and C1 (if λ < λ
∗(θ2)), whereas both consumers
will be served in region A. Considering a duopoly with symmetric strategies only,
we reach the following conclusions. In regions A, B, and B1, the entire market
will be covered in equilibrium. All consumer types are served with a two-part
tariﬀ that extracts the entire surplus from low-demand consumers. The per unit
price in the tariﬀ is lower than the monopoly (two-part tariﬀ) per unit price in
regions A and B, whereas p12TT > p
12
M in region B1. In regions C and C1, we have
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Figure 7: Deviations from a symmetric strategy subgame in which both consumer
types are served (A). Along PC2 through A (7(a)-7(c)) or along PC2 (7(d)). Solid
lines represent the high-demand consumers’ indiﬀerence curves, and dashed lines
represent the indiﬀerence curves of low-demand consumers.
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Figure 8: Symmetric strategy Nash duopoly equilibria. Full market
coverage (A, B, and B1), multiple equilibria (C1 and C).
multiple equilibria. For the duopoly game, a symmetric strategy subgame where
both types are served, and a symmetric strategy subgame where low-demand
types are excluded, can both be Nash equilibria. If both types are served, the
per unit price p12TT is below p
12
M in region C1, whereas the opposite is the case in
region C.
Therefore, this particular case suggests that, to a large extent, a Nash equi-
librium in a duopoly where both ﬁrms serve only one type of consumer coincides
with the case where a monopolist prefers to serve only one type of consumer.
However, there are parameter values for which low-demand consumers would be
served in a duopoly, whereas they would be excluded in a monopoly.
4 Concluding remarks
Harrison and Kline (2001) have shown a way to extend the traditional Cournot
model to a setting with not only a per unit price, but also a ﬁxed fee. They
found that each ﬁrm sets a price per unit equal to marginal costs, and a positive
ﬁxed fee that approaches zero only when the number of ﬁrms becomes large. We
extended their model to account for demand-side heterogeneity, which is a natural
extension because most industries face heterogeneous demand. At the same time,
we added the assumption that a regulatory agency can impose a Universal Service
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Obligation on the ﬁrms. We found that the conclusions in Harrison and Kline
(2001) are not robust to such an extension because ﬁrms’ pricing strategies may
change when we allow for demand-side heterogeneity. In addition, we showed that
fostering competition may contribute to the fulﬁllment of the Universal Service
requirement that is common in industries such as telecommunications, which
applies nonlinear pricing on a normal basis.
If the market is covered – that is, if both types of consumers are served –
we found that the per unit price may be below marginal costs when as few as
four ﬁrms exist. In addition, the ﬁxed fee may be positive even with an inﬁnite
number of ﬁrms. Hence, the results in Oi (1971) cannot be extended to oligopoly
with heterogeneous consumers.
Our results showed that multiple Nash equilibria may exist. First, a po-
tential equilibrium outcome is that both ﬁrms serve only one type of consumer.
Numerical examples suggest that, to a large extent, this equilibrium outcome
coincides with the case where the monopolist chooses to serve only one type of
consumer. Nevertheless, the duopoly is more likely than a monopoly to cover the
entire market. Second, we found that both ﬁrms serving both types of consumers
can be an equilibrium outcome. In fact, we found no numerical examples where
the ﬁrms would deviate from such an outcome, beyond a very small set of excep-
tions that are economically uninteresting. Deviations from a symmetric strategy
subgame where both consumer types are served are not proﬁtable because the
rival, non-deviating ﬁrm has a ﬁxed quantity that acts as a constraint on the
deviating ﬁrm’s behavior.
A particular aim of this paper was to explore whether full market coverage
can arise as an equilibrium feature. Interestingly, we found that fostering compe-
tition can contribute to full market coverage and the fulﬁllment of the Universal
Service requirement. Our results showed that a subgame with a Universal Ser-
vice Obligation is robust against unilateral deviations. Hence, our model does not
support the theory that the ﬁrm operating under a Universal Service Obligation
serves low-demand segments of the market while other ﬁrms “skim the cream”
by serving the more proﬁtable high-demand segments.
Appendix
A Subgame 1. Only high-demand types served
We assume N(1− λ) identical consumers. Given that ﬁrm i serves a number of
consumers, ni, when it charges a tariﬀ (pi, Ai), and that all other ﬁrms charge
identical tariﬀs (p−i, A−i), ﬁrm i’s maximization problem reduces to maximizing
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proﬁt subject to voluntary participation and market clearing, as follows:
Πi = niAi + (pi − c)Qi. (A.1)
Ai = V (pi, θ2)− V (p−i, θ2) + A−i
QJ = (N(1− λ)− ni)q2(p−i)
Qi = niq2(pi).
(A.2)
Choosing Qi, knowing that the market clearing condition must be satisﬁed,
amounts to maximizing proﬁt with respect to pi, holding A−i, QJ , and Ai con-
stant. Hence:
(pi − c)dq2(pi)
dp
= 0 ⇒ pi = c. (A.3)
Now, given that pi = c is optimal, the ﬁrm determines the size of the ﬁxed fee
Ai by determining the optimal number of consumers to serve. Hence, under
the constraints of voluntary participation and market clearing, ﬁrm i maximizes
proﬁt with respect to ni, which yields:
dΠi
dni
= V (pi, θ2)− V (p−i, θ2) + A−i + ni
[
−V ′p
dp−i
dni
]
= 0. (A.4)
Substituting from the participation constraint in (A.2), diﬀerentiating the
market-clearing condition QJ = (N(1 − λ) − ni)q(p−i), and holding QJ ﬁxed,
enables us to state the following condition:
Ai =
ni
N − ni
[
q2(p−i)p−i
/−p−i dq2(p−i)dp
q(p−i)
]
(A.5)
Further, let ﬁrms have equal market shares, ni = N(1 − λ)/k. When all ﬁrms
charge the same unit price, pi = p−i = c, and the participation constraint binds,
we obtain Ai = A−i ≡ A. Keeping in mind the fact that consumer surplus must
be nonnegative, evaluating the condition in (A.5) for p = c yields the following
expression for the ﬁxed fee:
A = min
{
V (c, θ2),
cq2(c)
(k − 1)ε2(c)
}
. (A.6)
This veriﬁes the statements in Lemma 1.
B Subgame 2. Both types are served
Now, let A be determined at stage zero. If all ﬁrms apply identical ﬁxed fees, the
market clearing price must be the same across ﬁrms. In the following calculations,
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we impose the restriction that ﬁrm i chooses the same market coverage as all
other ﬁrms. Hence, if every other ﬁrm serves both consumer types, ﬁrm i aims
at designing a tariﬀ that will maximize proﬁt subject to the condition that both
consumer types are willing to participate in the market. Given that every other
ﬁrm holds its capacity ﬁxed, if ﬁrm i changes its capacity, the market clearing
price and the market share will change for every ﬁrm, including ﬁrm i.
Taking rival ﬁrms’ capacity as given, ﬁrm i maximizes proﬁt subject to mar-
ket clearing, given that both consumer types ﬁnd it individual rational to buy.
Πi = niA + (p− c)Qi. (B.1)
V (p, θ1)− A ≥ 0
QJ = (N − ni)[λq1(p) + (1− λ)q2(p)]
Qi = ni[λq1(p) + (1− λ)q2(p)].
(B.2)
The optimality condition is given by:
dΠ
dp
= ni
(
q(p, θ) + (p− c)q′p(p, θ)
)
+
dni
dp
(
A + (p− c)q(p, θ)). (B.3)
First, diﬀerentiating the market clearing condition QJ = (N −ni)q(p, θ), holding
QJ ﬁxed, and assuming ni = N/k, we can write:
dni
dp
=
N
k
(
k − 1)q′p(p, θ)
q(p, θ)
. (B.4)
Now, we can reformulate the optimality condition as follows:
p− c = q(p, θ)−kq′p(p, θ
− k − 1
k
A
q(p, θ)
. (B.5)
Finally, using the deﬁnition of the demand elasticity q′p(p, θ)p/q(p, θ) = −ε(p, θ),
we can write the mark-up as in Lemma 2.
p− c
p
=
1
kε(p, θ)
(
1− (k − 1)ε(p, θ) A
q(p, θ)p
)
. (B.6)
Given the reduced form proﬁt after the last stage of the game, ﬁrms will choose
A such that the low-demand types’ participation constraint is just binding if they
can freely choose the ﬁxed fee at stage zero. Hence:
A = V (p, θ1). (B.7)
This veriﬁes the statements in Lemma 2
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C Tariﬀ and proﬁt in the numerical example
The following gives the ﬁrms’ pricing in the two subgames of the duopoly, ac-
cording to Lemmas 1 and 2. Superscript 12 is used when both consumer types
are served and superscript 2 is used when type 1 consumers are excluded, while
k denotes the number of active ﬁrms.
C.1 Only type 2 consumers are served
Pricing is given by Lemma 1. The unit price is always equal to marginal cost,
p2TT (2) = p
2
TT (3) = · · · = p2TT (k) = c, and the ﬁrms’ proﬁt per consumer is
whatever they manage to capture via the ﬁxed fee A2TT (k). Hence, Π
2 (k) =
N(1−λ)
k
A2TT (k). With less than three active ﬁrms, we have:
A2TT (2) = A
2
TT (3) =
1
8
(2θ2 − 1)2 .
With more than three ﬁrms, we have:
A2TT (k) =
(2θ2 − 1)2
4 (k − 1)
C.2 Both consumer types are served
Pricing is given by Lemma 2. With two active ﬁrms, we have:
p12TT =
4
5
θ − 1
5
√
θ2 + 5(θ − 1)2,
A12TT =
1
2
(
1− 4
5
θ + 1
5
√
θ2 + 5(θ − 1)2
)2
,
Π12TT =
N
100
(
20(θ − 1)2 + (5− 2θ)
(
θ +
√
θ2 + 5(θ − 1)2
))
.
The per unit price in a corresponding monopoly is p12M = θ − 1/2, whereas the
per unit price in a corresponding capacity game with uniform pricing is p12UC =
1
3
(θ +1). Hence, p12TT = p
12
M for θ = (1/2)(
√
2+ 1), and p12TT < p
12
UC for θ ∈ 〈1, 2〉.
With k active ﬁrms, the per unit price solves:
p12TT (k) = c +
q(p, θ)
k
(
1− (k − 1) q1(p)
2
2q(p, θ)2
)
,
and
A12TT (k) =
1
2
(
q1(p
12
TT )
)2
, Π12TT (k) =
N
k2
(
1
2
q1(p
12
TT )
2 + q(p, θ)2
)
.
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The per unit price is declining in k, and hence, the ﬁxed fee is increasing in the
number of ﬁrms. In addition, as k goes to inﬁnity, proﬁt becomes:
The cut-oﬀ value λ∗(θ2) in a monopoly solves the equation N(1 − λ)V (c, θ2) =
N
(
V (p, θ1) + (p
12
M − c)q(p12M , θ)
)
.
When both consumer types are served in a k-ﬁrm oligopoly and all ﬁrms charge
a uniform price, we have:
p12UP (k) =
2θ + k
2(k + 1)
, and Π12UP (k) =
N
k
(2θ − 1)2
4(k + 1)2
.
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